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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder as Applied
to Commodities Fraud: No Intent
Required
INTRODUCTION
Futures trading is a basic adjunct of the marketing of agri-
cultural and other commodities, and a source of speculative ac-
tivities by a growing number of American investors.'
Due to the risk and complexity of commodity trading, even
knowledgeable and experienced commodities investors frequently
lose money through futures2 trading. 3 Since it is difficult to deter-
mine exactly why they lost money, investors often make easy targets
for fraud by their brokers.
The focus of this Comment is on commodities fraud. One
common type of commodities fraud is known as "churning. ' 4
, S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. i1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADuMI. NEws 5843, 5852.
2 A "future" is a contract providing for future delivery of the actual commodity. A
person desiring to trade in a given commodity buys or sells a future. R. STsvENsoN & E.
JENN N os, Fu DAmNTrrAms or INvESTmENTs 445 (3d ed. 1984).
Commodities trading is accomplished through a series of steps. First, the customer
places his order with a solicitor or account executive, who transmits the order to the
exchange trading floor. Once the order is received on the floor, a runner carries the order
to a floor broker located in the trading area (also called the "pits").
The actual futures contracts trading occurs in a loud, active market similar to an
auction house. The Commodities Exchange Act, as well as the rules and regulations of the
individual commodity exchanges, require that the transaction occur in an open, competitive
manner by "outcry or posting of bids and offers." This requirement ensures that all trades
are executed at competitive prices.
Once a trade is executed, it must be confirmed through a clearinghouse. The clearing-
house confirms the trade by "matching all buys and sells which are executed" on a particular
day. Next, the clearinghouse becomes the seller of all orders to buy and the buyer of all
orders to sell, and it is given legal responsibility for the opposite side of every transaction.
The clearinghouse also receives deliveries of futures contracts. When a seller is to make
a delivery, he must file a delivery notice with the clearinghouse one day before the intended
delivery. Then the clearinghouse assigns the notice of delivery to one of its members for
trading. S. REP. No. 1131, supra note 1, at 5856-58.
4 For examples of churning, see Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 644 (10th
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Churning5 is defined by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission 6 (hereinafter CFTC) as "excessive trading of an ac-
count by a broker for the purpose of generating commissions,
without regard for the investment or trading objectives of the
customer. " 7
In 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act8 (hereinafter CEA) was
enacted to regulate commodity trading. Section 4b9 is the general
antifraud provision of the CEA. Section 4b reads in part,
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market
in connection with any contract of sale of any commod-
ity for future delivery
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other
person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person
any false report or statement thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other per-
son. 10
A customer or the CFTC may bring an action under Section
4b(1)(A) against a broker who engages in commodities fraud." It
has been well established' 2 that two of the elements of a commod-
ities fraud claim are control by the broker over the customer's
account 3 and excessive trading in light of the customer's investment
Cir. 1985); Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 623 F Supp. 1014, 1024
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
Churmng will support a claim for relief under section 22(a)(1) of the Futures
Trading Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1983).
6 The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is the federal regulatory
agency responsible for the admimstration and enforcement of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1988).
Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644; see also Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities,
688 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court noted several factors that evidenced control:
plaintiff followed nearly all of the broker's suggestions, lacked experience, and lacked
understanding of the transactions); Khalid Bin Alwaleed Foundation v. E. F Hutton &
Co., 709 F Supp. 815, 816-17 (N.D. Il. 1989) (the court stated that an excessive turnover
ratio or comnussion-to-equity ratio must be determined to allege churning).
8 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1988).
9 7 U.S.C. § 6b.
10 Id.
" 7 U.S.C. § 6b. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized that a customer has a pnvate right of action
against Ins broker for violations of § 4b of the CEA.
12 See Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644; Booth v. Peavey Co. Commoditiy Services, 430 F.2d
132, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1970); Evanston Bank, 623 F Supp. at 1024.
13 "[T]he reqmsite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows the
recommendations of the broker." Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th
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objectives. 14 However, there has been much debate over whether
the mental state required to support a commodities churning claim
is scienter.15
This Comment examines scienter as a required element of a
commodities fraud claim. Part I defines commodities fraud, and
in particular commodities churning, and explains how it is shown. 16
Part II details a brief history of futures trading. 17 Part III examines
the legislative history of commodities fraud.18 Part IV presents an
objective overview of the caselaw discussing scienter as an element
of a commodities fraud claim. 19 Part V presents an analysis of the
legislative history, as well as a detailed analysis of the word "de-
fraud" as used in Section 4b(1)(A) of the CEA. 20 Finally, this
Comment concludes that scienter is not required to support a
commodities fraud claim. 21
I. WHAT IS COMMODITIES CHURNING AND How is IT SHOWN?
Commodities churning occurs when a broker trades excessively
in a customer's account, for the purpose of generating commissions
Cir. 1980); see also Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644 (ury instructions should focus on who was in
control of the account).
One author noted that "the essential question to be resolved is whether the dealer
occupied the status m respect to the customer that he may reasonably be held responsible
for any of the excessive trading complained of." Shelly v. Noffsinger, 511 F Supp. 687,
691 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, 794 F.2d 573, 582 (11th Cir. 1986) (considerations to be examined are the
intelligence of the client and the amount of trust he places m the broker). In general,
control is clearly established where the account is discretionary, a power of attorney has
been executed in favor of the broker, and the trades are completed without pnor approval
by the customer. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (an
action dealing with securities brokers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
1, "The essential, issue of fact is whether the volume of transactions, considered in
ight of the nature and objectives of the account, was so excessive as to indicate a purpose
on the part of the broker to derive a profit for himself at the expense of his customers."
Costello v. Oppenheimer, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1368; see also Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644 (excessive
trading is an element of churning).
11 Scienter has been defined by the Supreme Court as a mental state embracing "intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
1" See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
'7 Futures trading is snyonymous with commodities trading. See infra notes 32-40 and
accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
2o See infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. But see Johnson, Applying Hoch-
felder in Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C.L. Rv. 633, 635 (1978); Note, The Element of
Scienter in Antifraud Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 39 WASH. AND LEE L.
Rnv. 1175 (1982); BROmBEPG & LowEN'imss, SiEcurr is FuUD & COMMODrrms FRAUD Vol.
5, § 13.3 (1582) (1) (1984); J. Muxmm, ComoDms REGULATIOm FRAUD, MANIPULATION
& OranR CLAIMs v.13 §§ 3.01-3.03 (1990).
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for himself without regard for the investment goals of the cus-
tomer. Since churning is one type of fraud, 22 and Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that allegations of fraud
be "stated with particularity," 23 to satisfy Rule 9(b), the plaintiff
must identify the commodities involved, the nature of the com-
modities, the amount and dates of the transactions in question,
and produce evidence sufficient to show that the accounf was
excessively traded. 24
The existence of excessive trading in a commodities account 2-
is a question of fact, not a question of law 26 A universally precise
formula for calculating excessiveness is therefore unavailable.
"There are, however, indicia of excessive trading that 'may aid the
fact-finder by introducing some niasure of objectivity or certainty
into an otherwise recondite subject. ' These indicia include the
annualized commission td equity ratio, the turnover rate, and a
pattern of in-and-out day trading." 27 Additionally, an investor's
2 A customer bnnging a civil action has the burden of establishing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the churning of her account. Hecht v. Hams Upham & Co., 430 F.2d
1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970). If the customer makes a prima facie showing of excessive trading
for the purpose of generating comiussions, "the burden shifts to the [defendants] to produce
evidence that there was a legitimate basis for their trading strategy." Parciasepe v. Shearson,
Hayden, Stone, Inc., CFTC Docket No. R 79-795-80-123 [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,464 (Jan. 2, 1985); see also Dunn v. Contemporary Fin.
Corp., CFTC Docket No. 83-R913 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,955 (Feb. 25, 1986).
23 FD. R. Civ P 9(b).
- Khalid Bin Alwaleed Foundation v. E. F Hutton & Co., 709 F Supp. 815, 817
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
25 The standard for excessive trading in the commodities fraud context is generally
higher than the standard for excessiveness in the securities fraud context. See Gnswald v.
E. F Hutton & Co., Inc., 622 F Supp. 1397, 1407 (D.C. ill. 1985); Booth v. Peavey Co.
Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (commodity accounts are heavily traded
accounts as compared to investing accounts).
- Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983); Booth, 430
F.2d at 135.
Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Costello, 711
F.2d at 1369).
The "commission to equity" ratio is the commissions earned by the broker divided by
the amount of equity in the customer's account.
The "turnover rate" of an account is "the ratio of the total cost of purchases made
for the account dunng a given penod of time to the amount invested. Whether a
particular turnover rate is excessive depends on the objectives of a customer." Costello,
711 F.2d at 1369, n.11. While numerous courts have used the annual turnover rate of an
account as an indicator of excessive trading, in In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc. of
California, CFTC Docket No. 78-48 [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,147 (Jan. 31, 1984), the CFTC held that since commodities futures contracts
are short-term instruments and have inherently fast turnover rates, and because of the
[VoL. 79
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experience and sophistication are relevant factors in the determi-
nation of whether a broker has churned that customer's account. 2
Once it has been established that the customer's account has
been fraudulently managed, damages must be calculated. Ideally,
damages should restore the customer to the position he would have
achieved but for the defendant broker's misconduct. 29 However, it
is often difficult to determine accurately what results a properly
managed account would have achieved.
Excessive commissions received by the broker and excessive
decline in the value of the customer's portfolio are two, types of
damages that usually result from the churning of a customer's
account) 0 It is necessary to remedy both of these harms in order
to fully compensate the victimized investor.31
II. THE HISTORY OF COMMODITIES TRADING
Modern commodity exchanges trace their origin to the medieval
trade fairs in Europe during the twelfth century 32 In the 1700's,
volatility of commodity prices, "the length of time that a futures contract is held is not
particularly revealing in determimng whether a commodities account has been trading
excessively." Id. at 28,247. Rather, the CFTC in Lincolnwood preferred to rely on the
monthly commission-to-equity ratio as an indication of churning. Id. at 28,249.
"In-and-out" trading is defined as "the sale of all or part of a customer's portfolio,
with the money immediately expended on other investments, followed shortly by the sale
of the newly acquired investments." Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688
F.2d 1193, 1203 n. l (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 869, 876 (1967)).
See Herman v. T & S Commodities, Inc., 592 F Supp. 1406, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Gochnauer v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (l1th Cir. 1987) (experience
and sophistication of investors is relevant in deternnimng the extent of the fiduciary duty of
care in explaining contemplated securities transactions).
2Herman, 592 F Supp. at 1421.
30 Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
31 Id. To help simplify the calculation of damages, the Second Circuit proposed the
following formula: (1) compute the market value of the customer's portfolio at the time
the broker began to aid and abet the fraud and the market value when the fraud stopped,
(2) subtract the value of the portfolio when the fraud stopped from the value of the
portfolio when the fraud began to determine the customer's "gross economic loss", (3)
reduce that loss by the average percentage decline in the value of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, the Standard & Poor's Index or any other well recognized index during the period
when the churning was taking place. If, during the relevant period of time, the stock market
declined in value by 25 percent, then the gross economic loss should be reduced by 25
percent. Additionally, the customer is entitled to the return of commissions on the trans-
actions falling within this period of time and interest on those commissions. Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1978).
32 S. Rm' No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmnw. NEws 5843-5852.
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following the example of European ancestors, American producers
and merchants began to trade their commodities at the market. 33
These trades were primarily "spot" deliveries 34 for cash.3 5
"Spot" deliveries caused problems for both the farmer and the
merchant buyer. The farmers all brought their commodities to the
market at harvest time each year. Tins led to a supply greatly
exceeding demand, which depressed the market price for the com-
modities. Because the commodities were perishable goods, this led
to excessive waste. Months later, after the commodities were con-
sumed or spoiled, demand exceeded the supply, prices skyrocketed,
and people went hungry 36
These problems forced the emergence of future trading of
commodities, 37 which developed in the Umted States between 1850
and 1900. Future trading of commodities developed as a response
to the increasing economic need for large scale risk bearing in the
agricultural market. 3 During the infancy of the futures39 market,
market regulation was virtually nonexistent, and this led to irre-
sponsible trading. Such irresponsibility led to repeated efforts to
abolish futures trading altogether. 40
IIL THE HISTORY OF CoMMoDITIEs FUTuRES REGULATION
In 1844, the first bill to prohibit futures trading was introduced,
followed by similar proposals over the next fifty years. From 1895
to 1920, the desire to abolish futures trading slowly gave way to
efforts to regulate futures trading. 41
11 Id. at 5853. The first trades were for items such as eggs, butter, vegetables and
grains.
4 "Spot" deliveries occur when the merchants pay the full cash price "on the spot."
R. S. WURmAN, A. Saioa & K. M. Moius, TaE WALL STREET JoURNAL GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDINr MoNEY & MIAaETs 76 (1989).
31 See S. REP. No. 1131, supra note 32, at 5853.
3 Id.
11 "Trading in futures provides not only the market of today, but of months ahead,
and affords guidance to buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities in planning ahead,
and in financing and marketing commodities from one season to another." Id. at 5854.
3 Id. at 5853.
39 Futures are current agreements to be performed in the future. The buyer and seller
agree on the future date of delivery, the price to be paid at that date, and the quantity and
quality of the commodity. Forward contracting of commodities solved the problem of
availability and demand. However, it did not help to control the financial risk of loss that
accompamed rapidiy changing prices which resulted from bad weather, inadequate storage,
and the poor economic conditions of the 19th century. Id. at 5854.




A review of the legislative history of the attempts to regulate
the commodities markets reveals that Congress' objectives were
initially unclear as to antifraud measures. 42 It is no wonder that
there have been many interpretations of Congress' actual inten-
tions. 43 However, a close examination reveals that although initially
hesitant, Congress later was intent on developing legislation that
does not require scienter. 44
Regulation of future trading began m 192245 with the Grain
Futures Act, 46 renamed the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936.47
In 1928, legislation was introduced to amend the Grain Futures
Act to "insure fair dealings and to prevent fraudulent prac-
tices. ."4 Although the 1936 Act contained no antifraud pro-
vision, the amendment would have made it illegal to "knowingly"
defraud a customer. 49 The amendment was rejected, apparently
42 See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
41 S. REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AnhmN. NEws 1673-76.
4' Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-22).
4 Commodities Exchange Act, Pub. L. 74-675, §§ 1-13, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974 (CFTCA), Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22),
substantially amended the CEA. These amendments created the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), an independent federal agency, to assume authority over futures
trading, replacing the Department of Agriculture. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AnsmN. NEws 5843. The CFTCA gave
the CFTC exclusive administrative jurisdiction to regulate commodity trading:
[The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to ac-
counts, agreements and transactions involving contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market
or any other board of trade, exchange, or market. And provided further,
[t]hat, except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall
(i) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities
and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of
the United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange
Commission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and
responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Notlung in this section shall
supersede or limit the junsdiction conferred on the courts of the United States
or any State.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
48 Gram Futures Act: Hearings on Amendments Before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1928) (statement of Mr. J. W T. Dewel,
Chief, Gram Futures Administration, Department of Agriculture).
4 S. 3575, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1928); H.R. 11952, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3
(1928).
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because Congress believed that prosecution under state laws was a
sufficient deterrent for fraud. 50
In 1932, two amendments were introduced that again would
have added antifraud provisions to the Grain Futures Act. The
first bill was H.R. 7608.51 Section 4A of this legislation would have
made it unlawful "knowingly and with intent to defraud any
person, to fail truly, fully, and correctly to account to such, or to
cheat or defraud any person in any manner whatsoever -52 This
provision, which clearly would have required scienter, -was rejected
by the House Committee on Agriculture. 3
Instead, the Comrmttee on Agriculture favored the second bill,
H.R. 12287, 54 which provided that it would be unlawful for a
broker to commit any of the following acts:
(1) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such
person [the broker's customer];
(2) willfully to make or cause to be made to such person any
false report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to
be entered for such person any false record thereof;
(3) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such person by any
means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract. 55
In 1936 Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act, 56 which
contained language virtually identical to the language of H.R.
12287 The decision to include the language of H.R. 12287 and
reject the language of H.R. 7608, which would have required
scienter, reveals Congress' intent to exclude a scienter requirement
from the Act.
When it amended the criminal provisions of the CEA in 1978,
Congress again evidenced its intent to exclude scienter as a required
element of civil claims.57 This amendment provided that a violation
of section 6b8 would support a conviction only if committed
"knowingly " The Conference Committee Report 59 explained that
10 H.R. 1637, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 32 (1934).
11 H.R. 7608, 72d Cong., ist Sess. § 4A (1932).
52 Id.
11 H.R. REP. No. 1551, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
14 H.R. 12287, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4b (1932).
"Id.
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
17 Futures Trading Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 865 (1978). This amendment changed a § 6b
violation from a misdemeanor to a felony.
58 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
19 S. REP. No. 1239, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978).
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the word "knowingly" was specifically intended to require "scien-
ter" as an element of a section 6b criminal violation. However,
Congress did not amend the civil provisions of the CEA to include
scienter. By failing to add scienter as an element of a civil violation
of the CEA when it did so for criminal violations, Congress dem-
onstrated that it intended to distinguish the two causes of action
and exclude scienter from the elements of a civil violation.
IV CASES DISCUSSING SCIENTER AS A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF A
COMMODITIES FRAuD CLAIM
A. Cases Requiring Scienter
Three lines of reasoning have emerged in support of scienter
as a requirement for commodities fraud violations.
First, some courts include scienter as an element of commodi-
ties fraud as if there has never been any doubt that a commodities
fraud violation requires intent to defraud. 60 For instance, in Schin-
dler v Chas. A. Stockley & Gabriel Brokerage, Inc.61 the court
said "[t]he state of mind of the trader is of primary importance
because the very definition of churning assumes that the purpose
of the trading pattern is to generate commssions at the expense of
the customer and without, regard to the customer's trading objec-
tives. ' 16 2 The court, however, never actually defined churning; it
simply assumed that the definition included scienter.
Second, some courts 3 hold that if the words of a statute are
clear, there is no need to look to the legislative history Supporters
of this line of reasoning assert that the words of Section 4b(l)(A)
clearly require intent and thus no further analysis is required. The
Eighth Circuit in McIlroy v Dittmeri 4 stated this reasoning:
6* See Hill v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986)
(court rejected liability based on mere negligence and required a degree of intent beyond
negligence); Schindler v. Chas. A. Stockley and Gabriel Brokerage, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 2186,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. August 16, 1985) (claim of churning requires three elements: control,
excessive trading, and intent to increase commissions); McCurmn v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347
F Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972) ("That section [7 U.S.C. § 6b] is clearly directed only towards
willful misconduct.").
11 Schindler, No. 83 Civ. 2186, slip op.
6 Id.
63 McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1984); McCarthy v. PaineWebber, Inc.,
618 F Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Mcllroy, 732 F.2d at 102.
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Section 4b(A) prohibits "cheat[ing]," "defraud[ing]," and
"attempt[ing] to cheat or defraud." The words of the statute
themselves negate any inference that Congress meant to proscribe
unintentional acts under section 4b(A). Indeed, the words
"cheat" and "defraud" themselves imply a degree of intention-
ality that would probably render the inclusion of "willfully" in
Section 4b(A) superfluous. Estabishlng a violation of Section
4b(A) requires proof of something more than mere carelessness. 61
A close reading of the statute does not support this view because
"scienter-type" language, such as "knowingly," or "intention-
ally," is excluded.
Third, at least one court has looked beyond the mere words of
the statute and has compared commodities fraud to common-law
fraud.6
A common-law action for fraud requires a false representa-
tion of a matenal fact with knowledge or belief on the part of
the defendant that the representation is false. The false represen-
tation must be made with the intent to induce the other party to
rely upon that representation. A fraud action under Section
4b(A) of the CEA is substantially the same. 67
B. Cases Not Requiring Scienter
Just as some cases fail to explain their inclusion of scienter as
an element of a commodities churmng claim, some other cases fail
to explain their exclusion of scienter. 8 The Third Circuit, in Bowley
v Stotler & Co.,69 simply held that the definition of churning
"includes two elements: control of an account by a broker, and
excessive trading.' '70
In Drexel Burnham Lambert v Commodity Futures Trading
Commission71 the D C. Circuit held that "reckless inattention to
obvious dangers to a client's interests in arranging a purchase or
sale for the client's account triggers liability under section 4b." 72
6Id.
" Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 789.
See, e.g., Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir. 1985).
"Id.
70 Id. at 644.
7- 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7 Drexel Burnham Lambert v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 850 F.2d
742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 623
F Supp. 1014, 1022 (D.C. Ill. 1985).
[VoL. 79
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In so holding, the court implicitly rejected the theory that an intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, as the Supreme Court defined
scienter in Hochfelder, 3 is required for a section 4b violation.
In Sail v G. H. Miller & Co.,74 the court found that section
6b of the CEA encompassed actual fraud as well as constructive
fraud and therefore held that "Congress did not intend § 4b(A) to
cover only actions taken with intent to defraud. 7 5
In Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder,7 6 the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that scienter is a requirement for a securities fraud viola-
tion.77 In Gordon v Shearson Hayden, Stone, Inc.7 1 the CFTC79
applied the analysis used m Hochfelder, and found that scienter is
not an element of a commodities fraud violation. 0
V APPLICATION OF THE HOCHFELDER ANALYSIS TO COMMODITIES
CHURNING CLAIMS
In Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder,1 the Supreme Court held that
scienter is a requirement of securities fraud. However, the Supreme
73 See supra note 15.
7, 612 F Supp. 1499 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
11 Sail v. G.H. Miller & Co., 612 F Supp. 1499, 1503 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
-' 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra note 15.
In Hochfelder, the defendant accounting firm was lured to penodically audit a bro-
kerage firm's books and records. The plaintiffs, who were customers of the brokerage firm,
invested money in a securities fund that was later revealed as fraudulently managed.
Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant for damages under § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act. It was alleged that the brokerage firm violated § 10(b), and that the defendant
had "aided and abetted" the fraud by its failure to properly audit the brokerage firm. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty of inquiry is liable in damages
for aiding and abetting a third person's violation of § lob-5 if the fraud would have been
discovered but for the breach of the duty of inquiry. The Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit, holding that a private cause of action will not lie under Rule lob-5 in the
absence of an allegation of "scienter" on the part of the defendant.
- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
78 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016 (April 10, 1980). But see Evanston Bank,
623 F Supp. 1014.
7The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of the futures industry,
although this exclusive jurisdiction does not preclude a private cause of action for violations
of the CEA. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982);
see supra note 6.
10 But see CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,169,
21,170 (April 9, 1981).
8- 425 U.S. 185 (1976) ("There is no indication, however, that § 10b was intended to
proscribe conduct not involving scienter."). But see Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STA. L. REv. 385 (1990). Professor Thel
states in his article that securities fraud does not require scienter and that the Supreme
Court decided Hochfelder incorrectly.
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Court has not addressed the issue of scienter in the context of
commodities fraud. Since commodities fraud is often compared to
securities fraud, 2 it is logical to believe that when the Supreme
Court finally addresses the issue, it will use a method of analysis
similar to the analysis the Court used in Hochfelder 83
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court used the following two-step
analysis to reach its conclusion: (1) examine the language of the
relevant statute,8 4 and (2) examine the legislative history and other
relevant authorities.85 This two step analysis is typical of that used
by the Court for statutory construction when the intent of Congress
is less than clear 86
A. Language of the Relevant Statute
The first part of the Hochfelder test requires an examination
of the language of the statute. Section 4b(A) of the CEA makes it
unlawful for a member of a contract market8 7 to "defraud" an-
2 See, e.g., First Commodity Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 676
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979); Evanston Bank v.
Conticommodity, 623 F Supp. 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, 422 F Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also
Johnson, Applying Hochfelder in Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C.L. REv 633 (1979).
83 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185. But see Johnson, supra, note 82 at 635 (applying
Hochfelder to commodity fraud cases and concluding that scienter is a required element).
84 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350 (1941).
11 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201; see also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)
("Our objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect
to the legislative will."); U.S. v. Gilliand, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) ("If the language of the
amended section could be deemed ambiguous, the legislative history of the amendment
would dispel any doubt as to the congressional purpose.").
" "Where as here, the resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and
the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative
history if the statutory language is unclear." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984);
see also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 85 (1985); Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 (1981); U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("In
determimng the scope of a statute, we look first to its language."); Consumer Prods. Safety
Comm'n v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 477 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("We begin with the familiar
canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979); Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978); Blue Chtp
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317
U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (resort may be had to explanatory legislative history, no matter how
clear the statutory words may appear on superficial examination since words are inexact
tools at best).
- "The wods 'member of a contract market' shall mean and include individuals,
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other. The common law definition of "fraud" includes both actual
fraud and constructive fraud.18 Actual fraud89 requires the plaintiff
to show that the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff.9°
Constructive fraud,91 however, has been consistently held not to
require such intent.92 Further, in Securities Exchange Commission
v Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,93 the Supreme Court pre-
sumed that Congress has not adopted the "technical" definition
of fraud, which includes only actual fraud; rather, fraud is pre-
sumed to include constructive fraud. As the CFTC noted in Gordon
v Shearson, Hayden, Store, Inc., tlus construction of the term
"defraud" is consistent with the definition of fraud as defined in
associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts owning or holding membership in, or
admitted to membership representation on, a contract market or given members' trading
privileges thereon." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
" Gordon v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016
(April 10, 1980). But see Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985).
" "Actual fraud consists in deceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and active
operation of the mind; it includes cases of the intentional and successful employment of
any cunmng, deception, or artifice used to circumvent or cheat another." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 594, 595 (5th ed. 1979); see also Perkins School v. Freeman, 741 F.2d 1503
(7th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102; Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.
1976).
9 W PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
91 "[Clonstructive frauds are such acts or contracts as, though not originating in any
actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons,
are yet, by their tendency to deceive or mislead other persons deemed equally repre-
hensible with actual fraud." BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 660, 661 (6th ed. 1979).
92Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889); see also Brazee v. Moms, 204 P.2d
475 (Ariz. 1949); Arkansas Valley Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Morgan, 229 S.W.2d 133
(Ark. 1950) (constructive fraud is a breach of either a legal or equitable duty, and does not
necessarily involve any guilt, intent to deceive, or actual dishonesty of purpose); In re
Arbuckle's Estate, 220 P.2d 950 (Calif. App. 1950) ("In its generic sense, constructive fraud
comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust, or confidence and resulting in damage to another."); Sioux City v. Western
Asphalt Paving Corp., 271 N.W 624 (Iowa 1937); Loucks v. McCormick, 424 P.2d 555
(Ka. 1967) (constructive fraud is a breach of either a legal or equitable duty, and does not
necessarily involve any guilt, intent to deceive, or actual dishonesty of purpose); Fire Assoc.
of Philadelphia v. Vantine Paint & Glass Co., 133 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1965); Bank v. Board
of Education, Ill N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1953); Maxwell v. Land Developers, Inc., 485 S.W.2d
869, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) ("Constructive fraud may be established where there is a
breach of legal or equitable duty, whether or not fraudulent intent be present."); Purcell
v. Robertson, 8 S.E.2d 881 (W Va. 1940).
91 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). ("The foregoing analysis of the judicial treatment of
common law fraud reinforces our conclusion that Congress, in empowering the courts to
enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to
require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client."). But see Greenwood, 776
F.2d 785 (Greenwood is not representative of the more prevalent traditional view and seems
to be an isolated case).
1990-91]
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1936 when the CEA was enacted.94 At least one court has held
scienter is an element of common law fraud in a commodities
context. 95 However, the more widely held view seems to be that
common law fraud includes constructive fraud and thus requires
no scienter. 96
Constructive fraud, however, applies only to parties having a
fiduciary relationship. 97 For fraud to exist, there must be a breach
of the fiduciary duty with ensuing harm to the plaintiff. The cases
have repeatedly recognized that futures commission merchants98
stand in a fiduciary relationship with their customers. 99 The lan-
guage of section 4b(A) also supports this conclusion.100
Further support for this construction of the term "defraud" is
found by viewing section 4b in its entirety Section 4b(1)(A) makes
it unlawful to "cheat or defraud." 101 Section 4b(1)(B) makes it
unlawful "willfully to make or cause to be made to such other
person any false report or statement. ,,"02 Section 4b(1)(C) makes
it unlawful "willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive. . " (em-
phasis added).10 3 The Supreme Court stated, in United States v
Atchison, T & S.F Ry Co., that when attempting to interpret a
statute, "[t]he presence of a provision in the one part and its
absence in the other is an argument against reading it as im-
plied."' 4
" WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTiONARY 332 (2d ed. 1936), defines "fraud," when
used in a legal context, to include both actual fraud and constructive fraud. WEBSTER'S
treats the term "cheat" as synonymous with "defraud."
Greenwood, 776 F.2d at 789.
96 See, e.g., Gordon, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016 (April 18, 1980); Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195.
91 Fiduciary relationships include trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent
and pnncipal, and attorney and client. A fiduciary Is "under a duty not to profit at the
expense of the other and not to enter into competition with him without his consent. "
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 2b (1959).
" "The words 'futures comussion merchant' shall mean and include individuals,
associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting
orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery. " 7 U.S.C. § 2
(1988).
" Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 548 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir.
1977); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F Supp. 951, 952-53 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Union Bank of
Switzerland v. HS Equities, Inc., 457 F Supp. 515, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'0 Section 6(b) applies only to persons who act "for or on behalf of any other person"
involved in the making of future contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
101 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1988).
MO 7 U.S.C. § 6b(B) (1988).
,o 7 U.S.C. § 6b(C) (1988).
,o 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1922); see also U.S. v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979).
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In Hochfelder, when the Supreme Court held that scienter was
required for a securities fraud violation, it placed heavy emphasis
on the phrase "mampulation or deceptive device." 105 Manipulation
is defined as a "series of transactions involving the buying or
selling of a security for the purpose of creating a false or misleading
appearance of active trading or to raise or depress the price to
induce the purchase or sale by others."I 106 "Manipulation," by
definition, includes the element of intent. "Manipulation" or sim-
ilar language does not appear m Section 4b(A) of the CEA, thus
providing more evidence that Congress did not intend for scienter
to be a required element of a commodities fraud claim.
B. Legislative History of the CEA
The second part of the Hochfelder test is an examnation of
the legislative history The legislative history behind the CEA in-
dicates that Congress was unwilling to require scienter as an ele-
ment of commodities fraud.1° The first piece of legislation enacted
to regulate commodities trading contained no antifraud provi-
sion. 08 Once the need for an antifraud provision became apparent,
legislation was rejected that would have unmistakably required
scienter for a commodities fraud violation.' °9 The antifraud pro-
vision that Congress finally enacted was void of any language
promoting scienter as a requirement of a commodities fraud claim." 0
Congress, on several occasions, had the opportunity to amend
the CEA to clearly require scienter as an element of commodities
fraud"' but declined to do S0.112 When it amended the criminal
(but not the civil) provisions of the CEA in 1978, Congress most
clearly indicated its intent to exclude a scienter requirement for
civil claims." 3 If Congress intended to add a scienter requirement
for civil claims, presumably it would have amended the civil pro-
vision to include the word "knowingly "
,01 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197. "Use of the word 'mampulation' is especally signif-
icant."
' BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 868 (5th ed. 1979); accord WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL-
LE ATE DIcTIoNARY 724 (9th ed. 1983). But see Thel, supra note 81 at 378.
207 See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
,o Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922); see supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
,0, See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
22 See 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1988).




Whether scienter is a requirement of a section 4b(A) commod-
ities fraud violation will remain unsettled as long as the courts fail
to apply the Hochfelder-type analysis in a commodities setting.
The cases that have held that scienter is a required element of
commodities churmng'14 are based on faulty logic or no logic at
all. A thorough examination of the legislative history of section 6b
of the CEA indicates that Congress has repeatedly refused to
include scienter as an element of commodities fraud.1 5 On several
occasions, Congress has had the opportumty to set the required
mental state at scienter, but has steadfastly refused to do so for
civil claims. Further, a careful review of the wording of sections
4b(l)(A), (B), and (C) of the CEA provides evidence that the
scienter element is not found in Section 4b(l)(A).
Although commodities trading is often compared to securities
trading, they involve wholly distinct statutory restrictions. There
are, however, similarities between the two that facilitate the use of
the Hochfelder analysis for a determination of the elements of a
.commodities churmng claim. The use of the Hochfelder test leads
inescapably to the conclusion that scienter is not an element of a
commodities churning claim.
Harry B. Borders
114 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
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